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VAGUENESS AND ENFORCEABILITY:
POTENTIAL PROBLEMS OF THE 1991 THAI
TRADEMARK ACT
Sakda Thanitcult
Abstract: In 1991, Thailand adopted a new Trademark Act, which, among other
goals, increased protection of trademark and service mark agreements. However, en-
forcement of these new rules has not been clearly defined. In the first portion of this
article, the author examines the new rules for trademark agreements in Thailand. These
rules give extensive discretion to the Thai Registrar, yet have potential problems in en-
forcing standards such as quality control. The next section examines Thai public policy,
and analyzes how other industrialized nations enforce their policies on trademarks.
Finally, the article recommends that Thailand increase quality control, and more carefully
define the grounds for restricting trademark licensing agreements.
I. INTRODUCTION
The difficulty of interpreting Thai laws is a pressing concern for any-
one seeking to enter into a trademark licensing agreement in the Thai
market. Experts of the World Bank described the Thai legal system by
stating the following:
First and most obviously, Thai laws are sometimes badly
out of date .... Secondly, [the system] reinforces the bureauc-
racy's penchant for proposing laws that give it all-
encompassing powers, to cover as many future contingencies
as possible .... Most Thai legislation is very brief, limited to
granting specified ministries, or departments within ministries,
broadly worded empowerment.
The 1991 Thai Trademark Act is no exception. 2 For examp1e, the
new Section 69 of that law gives the Registrar undefined regulatory discre-
t Lecturer, Faculty of Law, Chulalongkom University, Thailand.
I SCOTT CHRISTENSEN ET AL., THAILAND: THE INSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF
GROWTH 20 (1993).
2 Praratchabanyat Kruaengmai Kankha Po So Song Ha Sam See [Trademark Act of B.E. 2534], in
PRARATCHAKITJANUBEKSA [THAI ROYAL GAzETTE] Vol. 108, Part 199, Nov. 15, 1991 [hereinafter TH/AI
ROYAL GAZETrE]. The new act repealed the Trademark Act, B.E. 2474 of 1931, as well as the Trademark
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tion to scrutinize trademark license agreements. A comparative study of the
experience of the United States, Japan, Korea and Taiwan in this particular
area of trademark licensing indicates that the new Thai Trademark Law will
eventually raise serious problems of predictability for concerned parties.
Because the new law is lacking in predictability, it does not provide confi-
dence to foreign trademark holders or the general public, nor does it aid in
their understanding of the law and the process of legal implementation.
One of the reasons that the Thai government enacted the new
Trademark Act was to recognize trademark and service mark licensing
agreements which have been recognized and protected under the modem
laws of many countries. 3 It is true that the Thai government amended
Trademark Act No.3 B.E. 2504 of 1961 in response to the demands of the
United States Trade Representative (USTR).4 However, other considera-
tions played a role in the development of the law. For example, the
provisions relating to trademark licensing agreements5 were partially mod-
eled after the Model Law for Developing Countries on Marks, Trade
Names, and Acts of Unfair Competition, 1967, of the United International
Bureaux for the Protection of Intellectual Property (BIRPI).6
For years before the present Trademark Act was enacted, trademark
licensing was governed by the provisions relating to contract in the Thai
Civil and Commercial Code.7 Following the recent enactment, trademark
Act No. 3, B.E. 2504 (1961). See also Nancy Morowitz. Thailand, in TRADEMARKS THROUGHOUT THE
WORLD T-23 (1993).
3 See generally Morowitz, supra note 2.
4 Ted McDorman, US-Thailand Trade Dispute: Applying Section 301 to Cigarettes and Intellectual
Property, 14 MICH. J. INT'L L. 90, 108-09 (1992). Professor McDorman wrote, "US pressure on Thailand
has resulted in some change. A new Trademark Act has been enacted which updates its 1931 predecessor
and which has broader coverage and more significant penalties for infringement of trademark rights. It
appears that the United States is satisfied with the new Thai legislation.' See also SURAKIART
SATHIRATHAI, THAILAND AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 24 (1987). Professor Sathirathai wrote, "[l]n
the case of Thailand, the U.S. has demands for Thailand's 'adequate' protection of US intellectual property
were presented in a package consisting of demands over various issues concerning market access .... As
to the specific IP issues, the U.S. has demanded a new trademark bill, replacing the present 1931
Trademark Act, in order to cover services and certification marks and increased penalties (both fines and
imprisonment) against trademark violators."
5 See Thai Trademark Act §§ 68-79 infra appendix pp. 53-56.
6 MODEL LAW FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES ON MARKS, TRADE NAMES, AND ACTS OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION 53-54 (United International Bureaux for the Protection of Intellectual Property, 1967). See
also Thai Trademark Act § 68(2) infra appendix p. 53.
7 Boonma Techwanich, Praden Sumkan Nai Kanjeraja Lae Kantam Sanya Anuyat Hai Chai Sitti Nai
Kanpalit Lae Druangmai Kankan [Major Issues in Trademark Licensing], in KANJERAJA LAE KANTAM
SANYA ANUYAT HAl CHAI SITrI BAEB TANG TANG [NEGOTIATION AND LICENSING AGREEMENTS] (Dhajjai
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licensing agreements are now primarily governed by the 1991 Act.8 Since
the United States, Japan, Korea and the Republic of China (Taiwan) have
had long experience with trademark licensing agreements, the Thai
Trademark Office and the Thai courts should look to those countries for
possible answers to problems related to trademark licensing agreements.
Thai officials should pay particular attention to the issues of quality control
and restrictive clauses.
Like the Thai Registrar's counterparts in industrialized nations, the
main task of the Registrar is to insure that the quality control clause is actu-
ally carried out by the licensor. However, the Registrar does not have
sufficient authority to scrutinize restrictive clauses contained in trademark
licensing applications. To support this argument, this article examines the
newly added provisions concerning trademark licensing agreements in the
Thai Trademark Act and identifies potential problems. Also, by drawing on
some of the experiences of the United States, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, this
article suggests that authorities could avoid anticipated problems by enforc-
ing quality control, and by removing vague restrictive clauses from the Act.
Finally, the appendix provides an English translation of the pertinent sec-
tions of the new Trademark Act.
II. CHANGES IN QUALITY CONTROL AND RESTRICTIVE CLAUSES WITHIN
THE NEW TRADEMARK LAW
A. New Rules for Trademark Licensing
The Thai Trademark Act of 1931, which was modeled after the
British Trademark Act of 1905, 9 contains no provisions regarding trademark
licensing. The new Act changes this situation. Its two major objectives are
to modernize the trademark law and to give the Registrar power over licens-
Suphahpolsiri ed., Chulalongkom University, Thail., 1988) 206, 218-219 [hereinafter Major Issues in
Trademark Licensing].
8 The Thai government clearly acknowledges such a commercial practice in its rationales to enact the
new Act. However, the Civil and Commercial Code still acts to explain and supplement the Trademark
Act. See THAI ROYAL GAZETTE, supra note 2.
9 Into Bo Champon, The Next "Little Tiger": Manufacturing and Intellectual Property Rights in
Thailand, 3 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 275, 322 n.238 (1990).
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ing agreements with respect to quality control.' 0 This has the effect of
creating a mechanism for consumer protection within the Act.11
In order to safeguard consumer interests, the Trademark Law requires
licensing agreements for registered trademarks to be in writing and to be
registered with the Registrar.12 Non-compliance with these formalities will
render a contract void. An agreement must include a clause which author-
izes the licensor of the trademark to control the quality of the goods
manufactured by the licensee.13 The agreement must also state the nature of
the goods to be affixed with the licensed trademark. 14
If the Registrar decides that the agreement will not cause confusion to
consumers and is not contrary to public order, or good morals or public pol-
icy, he may register the agreement with or without conditions or
restrictions. 15 If the agreement fails in any one of these categories, the
Registrar shall reject the agreement.16 The licensor or the licensee may then
appeal the Registrar's order or denial to the Trademark Board within 90
days of the date of receipt of the decision, or the order will be deemed fi-
nal. 17 Furthermore, the Board's decision on appeal is final.18
The licensor and the licensee may jointly request the Registrar to
change the provisions of the licensing agreement, particularly the type of
goods to be affixed with the trademark and the conditions and restrictions
stipulated by the licensor. 19 This section appears to provide an important
measure of flexibility. Amendment procedures will be specified in future
ministerial regulations. 20
According to the new rules, registration of a licensing agreement may
be canceled under various circumstances. The licensor and licensee may
jointly request cancellation of the agreement.21 Moreover, either party may
request cancellation if it can show that they have terminated the agree-
ment.22 Finally, either the Registrar or any interested party may request the
10 Dhajai Subhapholsiri, New Rules for Trademark Licensing, IP ASIA, Apr. 25, 199 1, at 20,21.
II Id. at 20.
12 Thai Trademark Act § 68(2) (1991).
13 Id. § 68(1) (1991).
14 Id. § 68(2) (1991).




19 Id § 71 (1991).
20 Id.
21 Id. § 72 (1991).
22 Id.
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Trademark Board to cancel the registration if: (1) the licensee uses the
trademark so as to "[cause] public confusion or [be] contrary to public order
or morality or public policy," or (2) the licensor is unable to control the
quality of the goods.23 The effect of canceling the registration under any
one of these circumstances is to terminate any license concerning the trade-
mark.24
B. Potential Problems of the New Trademark Act
The changes in the rules for trademark licensing give significant dis-
cretionary powers to the Registrar and the Board which may prove
problematic for trademark license agreements and business in general.25
Allowing the executive body the final decision on appeals of trademark li-
cense agreements appears to be a normal administrative law procedure.
26
However, the subjective nature of the decision regarding public order, good
morals, or public policy confers arbitrary power over the registration of
trademark license agreements. 27 This is particularly evident in Sections 68
and 69 of the 1991 Act, which give a great deal of discretionary authority to
the Registrar in the process of screening trademark license applications for
registration.
1. Potential Problems with Quality Control
The Registrar's ability to have any quality control over licensed
goods derives from Section 68 of the Act. This Section requires that the li-
cense agreement give the licensor power to control the quality of the
licensed goods.28 If the licensor does not retain quality control, the
Registrar must deny the license agreement. The question is thus, "How will
the Thai authority, with no experience but with a great deal of discretionary
power in processing trademark licensing applications, decide whether the
trademark owner actually exercises sufficient control to guarantee the qual-
ity of the goods provided to the public by the licensee?"
23 Id.
24 Id § 76 (1991).
25 Suchint Chaimungkalanont, Trademark License Agreements Under the Trademark Act of 1991, IP
ASIA, Jan. 1992, at 24, 26.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Thai Trademark Act § 68(1).
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The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) stresses that
the licensor's control over the use of its trademark must be effective.29
Merely having the power to control quality but never exercising it is not
sufficient. 30 Only by actively participating with the licensee can the licen-
sor control the nature and quality of the goods.31 Such control over quality
is essential to meeting the requirement of not deceiving or confusing the
public which is articulated in Section 69 of the Act.
The Thai Trademark Act does not define "quality" or "control" and
does not specify the means through which control is to be exercised in order
to meet the requirements of Section 68 or 69. It is also noteworthy to point
out that the new Trademark Act does not stipulate whether the licensor or
the licensee should be held liable for torts related to the nature and quality
of the goods or in connection with which the licensed mark is used. The
crucial question remaining for the Thai Registrar is to decide on a case-by-
case basis whether the trademark owner, in fact, exercises sufficient control
to -guarantee the quality of the goods provided to the public by the licensee
under the owner's trademark and, thereby, renders the licensee's use non-
deceptive to the public.
There are at least three reasons why the Thai authorities should care-
fully oversee the licensor's duty of quality control.32 These include: 1)
uniformity of the branded product, 2) guarantee that the product conforms
to the trademark owner's own standards of integrity, and 3) knowledge of
the licensee's identity if there is wide-spread licensing of a particular
mark.33 Although it is natural for the quality of a good to fluctuate
somewhat over time, the consumer has the right to assume that a
trademarked product conforms to expected standards, and that the quality
will not be dissipated by indiscriminate licensing. 34 In addition, the
trademark owner must be sufficiently vigilant in order to make certain that
there is no deterioration in the quality of products made by the licensee.35
29 WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, BACKGROUND READING MATERIAL ON
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 178 (1988).
30 Id. See also Guy M. Blynn, Trademark Licensing Basics and Key Issues (1985), reprinted in THE
LAW OF LICENSING A-9 (American Intellectual Property Law Association 1986).
31 Blynn, supra note 30, at A-9.
32 Harry L. Shniderman, Trade-mark Licensing - A Saga of Fantasy and Fact, 14 LAW &
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By following these considerations, the Registrar, through the licensor, can
maintain quality control and meet the "no public deception" requirement.
2. Potential Problems with Restrictive Clauses
When registering a trademark agreement, the applicant must also take
into account the Ministerial Regulations, which parallel the restrictive
clauses found in Section 69 of the Act. These administrative rules provide
that, in addition to Section 68's mandatory clauses regarding registration
and quality control, the agreement must not:
a) confuse or mislead the public;
b) be contrary to public order;
c) be contrary to good public morals; or
d) be contrary to public policy.3 6
These four requirements form the basic restrictions which are im-
posed on trademark agreements. Failing in one of these categories prevents
approval of the agreement.
a. Confuse or mislead the public
The Commercial Registration Department of the Ministry of
Commerce explained the rationale behind the new provisions related to li-
censing the use of trademarks.37 Although the practice of trademark
licensing has been widespread, there is no law governing the licensee's use
of the trademark.38 Some trademark proprietors have many non-exclusive
licensees. This may cause public deception because the quality of goods
under the same trademark may vary. The new law is meant to require that
the trademark licensor must have actual control over the quality of goods or
services manufactured under trademark licensing agreements. 39 The re-
quirement of actual control is a "must" in the laws of the United States,
36 Chaimungkalanont. supra note 25. at 26.
37 THE COMMERCIAL REGISTRATION DEPARTMENT OF THAILAND, SARA SANKAN KAWNO
PRARAiCHABANYAT KRUANGMAI KANKAH [EXPLAINING MAJOR AMENDMENTS IN THE NEW TRADEMARK
ACT OF B.E. 2534] (1992) [hereinafter EXPLAINING MAJOR AMENDMENTS]. (Materials prepared by the
Commercial Registration Department of the Ministry of Commerce, distributed at seminar to explain the
new Trademark Act to the public in 1992.)
38 Id
39 Id.
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Japan, Korea and Taiwan. Thus, it is natural for the Thai law to require the
same thing in order to protect the public from deception.
b. Be contrary to public order; and
c. Be contrary to good public morals
Before the new Trademark Act was promulgated in 1992, the legal re-
lationship between the licensor and the licensee was totally contractual and
subject only to general law, namely the various provisions related to con-
tract in the Thai Civil and Commercial Code. 40 One such provision is
Section 113 of the Civil and Commercial Code, which states that any part of
a trademark licensing agreement must not have an objective which is ex-
pressly prohibited by law, or is contrary to public order or good morals. 41
After the new Trademark Act was enacted, those same provisions in the
Civil and Commercial Code remain in effect, and must be taken into ac-
count when outlining or structuring licensing agreements.42 Agreements
that violate sections of the Civil and Commercial Code are considered
void.43 Thus, the drafters of the new Act did not necessarily have to rewrite
the requirement of the Civil Code Section 113 into Section 69, as it is re-
dundant.
d. Be contrary to public policy
This requirement is a major concern. What exactly is "public policy"
as related to trademark licensing agreements? One Thai attorney specializ-
ing in trademarks explained the meaning-of "public policy" as follows:
The Registrar may reject a trademark licensing agree-
ment if it is contrary to the public policy. Examples include: 1)
a trademark licensing agreement in which the licensor has ex-
cessive advantages over the licensee; 2) a trademark licensing
agreement in which the licensee is required to pay excessively
high royalty to the licensor; 3) a trademark licensing agreement
40 Subhapholsiri, supra note 10, at.20.
41 Chaimungkalanont, supra note 25, at 26.
42 Id.
43 Id.
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with unacceptable restrictive clauses imposed upon the licen-
see.44
If the above explanation is the real intent of the draftsmen of the new
Trademark Act of 1991, it is likely to result in enormous problems. Besides
being the Registrar of the trademark licensing agreements, the Thai
Registrar (generally the general-director of the Department of Commercial
Registration) will also have the same authority as the antitrust division of
the Federal Trade Commission in the United States, or as the Fair Trade
Commission in Japan, or as the Fair Trade Office in Korea, because he has
authority to screen almost any item in any trademark licensing applications.
This provides one person with an extraordinary amount of discretionary
power. Furthermore, the Registrar's duties require him to enforce policies
which large divisions of people administer in other industrialized nations.
Such discretionary power makes the law vague, and thus it cannot effec-
tively achieve specific policy objectives. The foreign licensors in Thailand
are familiar with laws that target specific public policy objectives. If the
policy behind the Thai Trademark Law is too broad, it may cause confusion.
This is the opposite of Thailand's stated goal, which is to modernize its
Trademark Law.
III. DEFINING "PUBLIC POLICY" RELATING TO TRADEMARK LICENSING
APPLICATION
Most industrial countries employ different government agencies and
laws to screen trademark licensing agreements for different criteria relating*
to public policy. Thailand, however, has only the Registrar to screen such
agreements. Furthermore, the Thai public policy is not well defined, either
by laws or by actions of the enforcement agency. This section first identi-
fies certain problems in the public policies of Thailand. It then reviews the
division of functions between agencies and laws in Japan, the United States,
Korea, and Taiwan. This review helps to identify the typical usage of
"public policy" relating to trademark licensing, which can in turn be used to
identify difficulties Thailand might face.
44 KOWIT SOMWAI, YAWLUK KODMA! KRUANGMAI KANKAH [SUMMARY OF THE MAJOR PRINCIPLES
IN THE TRADEMARK ACT OF B.E. 2534] 89 (Thail., 1992).
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A. Problems with Thai Public Policy
In 1987, Thai licensees spent about $3.2 million on foreign technol-
ogy. Among these payments, Thai licensees of international trademark
licenses paid about $140,000 for the use of foreign trademarks.4 5 The four
main sources of international licensing agreements in Thailand are Japan,
the United States, Great Britain, and Germany.46 Recently, a joint study
done by the Ministry of Science, Technology and Energy and the Bank of
Thailand, examined international licensing agreements formed between
1973 and 1986.47 This study found that Thai licensees paid excessively
high royalty fees.48 Some of the Thai licensees were so ignorant that they
agreed to pay royalty fees for technology that had patents which had already
expired. 49 Moreover, most of the licensing agreements contained restrictive
clauses, such as export restrictions.50 The results of this study reconfirmed
those of prior studies conducted by the Economics and Social Commission
for Asia and Pacific (ESCAP)5l and by Mingsan Santidam, a Thai econo-
mist.52 It is apparent from these studies that Thai licensees need more
protection when entering into a licensing agreement with a foreign country.
There were also at least two studies of how the Thai government
should intervene in those international licensing agreements.53 However,
these studies have not been translated into a national policy on technologi-
45 Narumol Thammaruk, Nayobai Lae Botbaht Tee Masom Kawng Rata Taw Kantam Sanya Anuyat
Hai Chai Sitti Tang Technology Kawng Pak Ekkachon: Tasana Kawng Pak Rataban [Appropriate Policies
and Roles of the State in Technology Licensing Agreements in the Private Sector: The Government's
Perspective], in KANTAM SANYA ANUYAT HAl CHAI SITrI BAB TANG TANG [NEGOTIATION AND LICENSING
AGREEMENTS] 1, 12 (Dhajjai Suphahpolsiri, ed., Chulalongkom University. Thail., 1988) [hereinafter
Appropriate Policies and Roles].46Id at 3.




51 KOSOL CHANTIKUL, KOTMAI TURAKIT RAWANG PRATED [INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTION LAWS]
751 n.33 (Thail., 1985) (citing ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL COMMISSION FOR ASIA AND PACIFIC (ESCAP),
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERRED THROUGH CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENTS: A CASE STUDY OF THAILAND).
52 Id at 747 n.20 (citing MINGSAN SANTIKARN, KANSEU WITrAYAKAN JAK BANSAT KAMCHAT DOY
KANTAMSANYA [BUYING TECHNOLOGY FROM TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATION BY CONTRACTUAL
ARRANGEMENTS]) (Dr. Mingsan Santikarn did a comprehensive study on more than 200 licensing agree-
ments that contained restrictive clauses.).
53 These studies were conducted by the United Nation Conference on Trade and Development(UNCTAD) and the United Nation Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) experts on technology
transfer. Id at 742 n.16, 743 n.17 (citing respectively UNCTAD, HANDBOOK ON THE ACQUISITION OF
TECHNOLOGY BY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (New York, 1978) and UNIDO, NATIONAL APPROACHES TO
THE ACQUISITION OF TECHNOLOGY BY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (New York, 1978)).
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cal development because of two major obstacles. First, the Thai private
sector strongly opposes the idea of government intervention.54 Second, the
experiences of government intervention in technology transfer in Malaysia,
the Philippines, India, and Mexico have not demonstrated that intervention
actually has a positive impact on national economic development. 55 Instead
of direct government intervention in international licensing agreements, the
Thai government allows licensees to import foreign technologies without
any constraints. 56
It is also important to explain the policy behind the so-called "Price
Control and Antimonopoly Act," which became effective on May 2, 1979.57
The Thai policy is different from the competition policy found in the anti-
monopoly and unfair trade laws of the United States, Japan and Korea. For
instance, the competition policy underlying the Japanese Antimonopoly
Law is to prevent the emergence of private monopolies by regulating acts
which may lead to such monopolies.58 The law prevents businesses from
forming an international agreement which would create an unreasonable re-
straint on trade or would constitute unfair trade practice. 59 On the other
hand, the policy behind the Thai Price Control and Antimonopoly Act is to
protect consumers from anti-competitive behavior by dominant firms by
establishing mechanisms to control the prices of goods.60
Thus, at the present time Thailand does not have either a technology
development or competition policy that has been articulated in formal laws.
There is no law that empowers the Thai Registrar to screen trademark li-
censing applications based on technology development policy or on
competition policy. The only power that the Thai Registrar has is to scruti-
54 See e-g.,Tawee Butarasunthom, Noyobai Lae Botgaht Tee Masom Kawng Rata Taw Kantam
Sanya Anuyat Hai Chai Sitti Kawng Pah Ekkachon: Tasana Kawng Pak Ootsahakum [Appropriate
Policies and Roles of the State in Licensing Agreements in the Private Sector: The Perspective of the
Industrial Sector], in KANJERAJA LAE KANTAM SANYA HAI CHAI Sirri BAEB TAN TANG [NEGOTIATION
AND LICENSING AGREEMENTS], 19, 19-26 (Dhajjai Suphapolsiri ed., Chulalongkorn University, Thail.,
198%)5 See Appropriate Policies and Roles, supra note 45, at 8.
56 SANTHAD ROJANASOONTHORN, TECHNOLOGY POLICIES AND PLANNING: THAILAND 33 (1986)
(While the government does not try to control technology transfer, it does try to regulate the foreign ex-
change remittances that come out of the agreements.).
57 TILLEKE & GIBBINS AND STANDARD CHARTER BANK, THAILAND BUSINESS BASICS § 3.4, 30
(Karen Gritzmacher Atkinson ed., Bangkok, Thail.. 1991) [hereinafter BUSINESS BASICS].
58 See e.g., HIROSHI ODA, JAPANESE LAW (1992).
59 Id at 361 (referring to Article 6(l) of the Law on Prohibition of Private Monopoly and Ensuring
of Fair Trade).
60 BUSINESS BASICS, supra note 57, at 30.
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nize those trademark licensing applications based on the "no-public decep-
tion" criteria authorized by the new Trademark Act.
B. Lessons from Other Nations
In many industrial nations, the government enacts specific legislation
to promote various public policies. Furthermore, separate agencies enforce
aspects of these laws. Common policy goals include promoting technologi-
cal development, regulating foreign competition, and preventing public
deception. By observing how other nations enforce these policy objectives,
Thai authorities could more effectively anticipate (and prevent) problems in
the area of trademark licensing.
1. Japan
Table 1: Japanese Policies and Enforcement Mechanisms
Policy Law Entity in charge
1. technological The Foreign Capital Law Ministry of
development The Foreign Exchange and Finance,
Foreign Trade Control MITI
Law
2. competition policy The Antimonopoly Law Japanese Fair
Trade
Commission
3. "no public The Trademark Law The Patent and
deception" Trademark Office
Several observations can be made about the Japanese screening sys-
tem. First, a technology licensing agreement will be approved by the
Ministry of Finance (MOF) or the Ministry of International Trade and
Industry (MITI) if it helps to bring about technology which the government
considers desirable. 61 Secondly, the Japanese Fair Trade Commission
(JFTC) will use administrative guidance to order the contracting parties to
61 See generally, N. Rosenberg, The International Transfer of Industrial Technology: Past and
Present, in NORTH/SOUTH TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: THE ADJUSTMENT AHEAD 25, 53 (Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development ed., 1982).
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delete restrictive clauses contained in the agreed contract.62 Thirdly, the
Patent and Trademark Office will make sure that any trademark licensing
agreement contains a quality control clause.63 Thus, a trademark licensing
application is subject to scrutiny under three policies, three laws, and at
least three governmental entities. It is apparent that Thailand could benefit
from similar diversification.
The Japanese system of scrutinizing international technology agree-
ments demonstrates three points. First, there must be a clearly stated policy
with regard to licensing agreements. Second, this policy must be translated
into a law. Finally, there must be a governmental entity to implement each.
law, and there must be sufficient numbers of trained staff to ensure proper
screening.64 It is also possible that the governmental entity in charge of en-
forcement of such a law, such as the JFTC, may develop its own
administrative guidelines. This action further limits bureaucratic discretion.
Thai law, on the other hand, gives substantial discretion to one person, the
Registrar. Furthermore, the only public policy defined in law is the policy
of "no public deception."
2. The United States
Table 2: U.S. Policies and Enforcement Mechanisms
Policy Law Entity in Charge
1. "no public The Lanham Act of The Patent and
deception" 1946 Trademark Office
2. competition policy The Antitrust Law The Antitrust Division
The Unfair of the Department of
Competition Law Justice and the Federal
Trade Commission
The United States government is concerned with two .main public
policy considerations. First is the requirement of "no public deception."
The second pertains to competition policy. The United States government
62 See generally, Masahiro Murakami, Regulation of International Licensing Agreements in Japan,
in THE LAW OF LICENSING P-i (American Intellectual Property Law Association 1986).
63 Yoshio Kumakura, Licensing, in DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN 6-1, 6-32 (Kitagawa Zentaro ed.,
1991)64 The JFTC alone has over 500 personnel. John 0. Haley & Mitsuo Matsushita, Japanese Antitrust
Law: Commentary and Cases 52 (1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file at the University of Washington
Law Library).
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has promulgated various laws to enforce these public policies. These laws
include the Lanham Act of 1946, the Antitrust Law, and the Unfair
Competition Law. The responsibility of enforcing these laws is entrusted to
different agencies. For example, the antitrust division of the Department of
Justice, which has over 500 full-time employees, enforces the antitrust
laws. 65 The United States divides the responsibility for screening trademark
licensing agreements between at least three laws and two governmental
agencies. Thus, specialized agencies can enforce specifically defined ob-
jectives.
3. Korea
Table 3: Korean Policies and Enforcement Mechanisms
Policy Law Entity in Charge
1. technological The Foreign Capital Ministry of the
development Inducement Promotion Economic Planning
Act Board
2. competition policy Monopoly Regulation The Fair Trade Office
and Fair Trade Act
(1980)
3. "no public The Trademark Law The Korean Patent
deception" Office
Korea modeled its strategy of technological development after Japan.
Korea imported appropriate advanced technology for assimilation and im-
provement while it simultaneously promoted the development of its
domestic technological capacity.66 Thus, it is not surprising that the public
policies of Korea relating to trademark licensing and other international
technology agreements are similar to Japan. Like Japan, Korea divides the
responsibility of screening three public policy issues between three laws and
their respective government agencies. Korea, as a newly industrialized
country, could serve as a model for Thailand, which is facing many of the
problems Korea faced in the early stages of its development.
65 ORGANISATION OF ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, COMPETITION POLICY IN OECD
COUNTRIES 277 (1990).
66 THE ASIAN AND PACIFIC CENTER FOR TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY (APCTT, TECHNOLOGY
POLICIES AND PLANNING: KOREA 22 (1986).
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4. Taiwan
Table 4: Taiwanese Policies and Enforcement Mechanisms
Policy Law Entity in charge
1. technological The Statute for Ministry of Economic




2. competition policy The Fair Trade Law Fair Trade
Commission
3. "no public The Trademark Law National Bureau of
deception" I Standards
While Korea modeled its intellectual property laws after Japan, 67
Taiwan has adopted many elements of the legal framework and concepts of
intellectual property laws of the United States.68 Apart from using these
concepts, Taiwan has developed its own legal framework for inducing tech-
nology from abroad.
From 1963 to 1985, the standards that Taiwan's Trademark Authority
employed in granting trademark licenses were neither clear nor consistent.69
Furthermore, the Trademark Authority often rejected the application for li-
censes on the grounds that foreign trademark owners had no domestic
factory, investment, or technology cooperation with domestic
manufacturers, and thus actual control was unlikely to exist.70 It appears
that this inference drawn by the Trademark Authority was inappropriate and
irrational. 71 The experience of Taiwan with the unclear criteria used to
screen trademark licensing applications can be divided into three periods,
discussed below. Each of these periods provides examples of difficulties
that Thailand may face.
67 See e.g., JOON Koo, LEE & PARTNERS, MANUAL ON INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY IN KOREA (loon Koo
Lee & Partners, Seoul, Korea, Sep. 1990).
68 See e.g., Kurt Stanberry, Forging a New International Frontier in Intellectual Property Rights, 13
WORLD COMPETITION: L. & ECON. REV. 3, 105, 115 (1990).
69 Sheau-Lin Homg, A Comparative Study of Trademark Licensing in Japan, the United States, and
the Republic of China 38 (1988) (unpublished LL.M. thesis, University of Washington).
70 Id at 37.
71 Id at33, 16, 17.
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a. 1963-1972
The Trademark Authority of Taiwan screened trademark licensing
applications from foreign owners pursuant to a directive promulgated by
Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA). This directive stated that the
Trademark Authority could not approve trademark licensing applications
unless the goods involved were of superior quality, were necessary or in
high demand within Taiwan, and the agreement would increase the domes-
tic industry as well as exportation.72 During this period, the practice of the
Trademark Authority caused a great deal of controversy and there were nu-
merous disputes. 73
b. 1972-1980
In 1972, the new Trademark Law set a new standard for approval. It
directed the MOEA to set requirements which would base the approval of
trademarks on the "need for developing the national economy." 74 The so-
called "need for developing the national economy" criterion used in
screening trademark license applications set a vague standard which was
open to broad interpretations by the Trademark Authority. This inconsistent
interpretation led to a great number of disputes between the Trademark
Authority and foreign companies during the period of 1972-1980.75 The
current Thai law also sets a vague standard, which may present similar
problems when dealing with foreign companies.
c. 1980-Present
Establishment of a more clearly defined trademark licensing criteria
became a necessary step. From 1980 to 1985, the MOEA promulgated and
amended the "Criteria for the Handling of Licensing of Trademarks Owned
by Foreign Enterprises." The Guidelines indicate that license agreements
meeting any of the following conditions should be approved:
72 Teruo Doi, Protection of Intellectual Property in the Republic of China: The Law and Practice,
in TRADE AND INVESTMENT IN TAIWAN 441,457 (Richard Cosway et al. eds., 1973).
73 Homg, supra note 69, at 37.
74 Doi, supra note 72, at 473 (referring to Article 26 of the 1972 Trademark Law of the Republic of
China Horng, supra note 69, at 16, 17.
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Art. 1) Where a foreign enterprise has obtained approval under
the Statute for Investment by Foreign Nationals ....
Art. 4) Where a foreign enterprise has obtained approval for a
technical cooperation under the Statute for Technical
Cooperation ....
Art. 5) Where the goods using a trademark which has registered
in the R.O.C. by a foreign enterprise are of excellent quality
and having international market, . . . provided that goods
manufactured are under the supervision and control of the
foreign enterprise so that the goods manufactured by the
licenses [sic] remains of the same quality as goods manufac-
tured by the foreign enterprise. 76
It is apparent from the 1985 Guidelines that the screening of strategic
technology has been shifted from the Trademark Authority to other govern-
mental agencies in charge of enforcing the Statute for Technical
Cooperation. Thus, it more clearly defined the screening criteria of
Taiwan's Trademark Authority. Furthermore, enforcement of the
Trademark Law focuses primarily on the "no public deception" criterion,
which brought it more in line with Taiwan's counterparts in the United
States, Japan and Korea. Thailand could benefit from following Taiwan's
example, and likewise bring the enforcement of the Trademark Law in line
with these other developed nations. If Thailand fails to do so, it could con-
tinue to face many of the problems that Taiwan faced prior to 1980.
IV. SUGGESTIONS TO IMPROVE THAI TRADEMARK POLICY
As mentioned above, one of the two major objectives behind the
amendment of the Trademark Act is that the Thai government sought to
modernize the Thai trademark law.77 Particularly, the government tried to
bring the law in line with Thailand's major economic partners. 78 These
partners include the United States, Japan, Korea and Taiwan. The experi-
ences of these advanced countries with issues in trademark licensing should
76 MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC AFFAIRS, CRITERIA FOR THE HANDLING OF LICENSING OF TRADEMARKS
OWNED BY FOREIGN ENTERPRISES arts. 1, 4, 5 (Industrial Development and Investment Center 1988)
(translating the Chinese version of 1985).
77 See generally Morowitz, supra note 2.
78 Subhapholsiri, supra note 10, at 21.
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certainly provide some useful ideas for Thailand. Following are some sug-
gestions drawn from the comparative study above.
A. Methods to Improve Quality Control Through the Registrar
The Thai Registrar should give special attention to the underlying
need for quality control. The Registrar should not just allow a company to
provide a well drafted clause which normally comes within the proviso of
Sections 68 and 69, but which does not provide any real mechanism for
product supervision. As WIPO emphasizes, "arrangements that are merely
a sham designed to placate official requirements not only fail to maintain
the function of a trademark but they destroy it."79
To improve quality control of trademarked goods, the Thai Registrar
needs to determine if there is effective supervision and control by the licen-
sor of the good. The Registrar may find helpful guidelines by looking to the
experiences of the United States courts. Decisions of the United States'
courts which deal with the supervision of quality control by trademark li-
censors could be studied and applied to the Thai context of screening
trademark licensing applications.
Since, for whatever reason, the new Trademark Act does not define
"quality" and "control" and measures for effective control, it is very possi-
ble that the Thai trademark authority will interpret the requirements
provision strictly. If defined too strictly, decisions may be irrational and in-
appropriate, as was the case in the early years of Taiwan's Trademark
Laws.80 The Thai Registrar should try to avoid such a situation by adopting
a flexible structure within which a trademark can be licensed. The Registrar
could adopt some of the standards that have been set by United States'
courts, for example: specification of a standard,8' testing of samples,82
plant supervision,8 3 inspection,8 4 training of the licensee's employees,8 5 ap-
proval of the licensee's advertising, 86 requiring the licensee to make refunds
to dissatisfied purchasers, 87 and cancellation of license provisions. 88
79 WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, supra note 29, at 178.
80 See Horng, supra note 69, at 33.
81 See generally Coca-Cola Co. v. J. G. Butler & Sons, 229 F. 224 (E.D. Ark. 1916).
82 See generally Crown Fabrics Corp. v. American Viscose Corp., 145 F.2d 246 (C.C.P.A. 1944)
83 See generally Bacardi Corp. of America v. Domenech. 311 U.S. 150 (1940).
84 See generally Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1959).
85 See generally Arthur Murray, Inc. v. Horst, 110 F. Supp. 678 (D. Mass. 1953).
86 See generally Smith v. Dental Prods. Co., 140 F.2d 140 (7th Cir. 1944).
87 See generally B.B. & R. Knight, Inc. v. W.L. Milner& Co., 283 F. 816 (N.D. Ohio 1922).
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The major problem that the Thai authority experienced prior to the
amendment in 1992, was that foreign trademark owners had contractual ar-
rangements with many local licensees, but did not participate in quality
control.8 9 Those local licensees were authorized to manufacture trade-
marked goods under a particular trademark.9 0 Because of the lack of actual
supervision and control by the licensor, the trademarked goods were of in-
consistent quality. 91 Thus, the public was sometimes confused and misled.
The amended version of the act allows the Trademark Authority to step in
and to ensure that the quality control will be actually carried on by the li-
censor in the future.92
Furthermore, when there are a number of different licensees produc-
ing a good under a single trademark, it may become necessary to reveal the
identity of the licensor and licensees. 93 This would allow consumers to
make an informed decision between goods.94
Korea provides an example of how consumers can be given this infor-
mation. The Korean authorities require that a Korean licensee using a
foreign trademark under a trademark license agreement must state the fol-
lowing:
i) Made in Korea
ii) Name of Manufacturer and place of manufacture
iii) The grounds for use of the mark, e.g. "Under Technical
Assistance of XYZ Co.," or "Under Trademark License of
XYZ."95
This label must be in the Korean language, and in reasonable prox-
imity to the licensed trademark.96
The Thai authority should adopt the requirement of notice of trade-
mark license to effectively protect consumers from confusion. Furthermore,
88 See generally E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co. v. Celanese Corp. of America, 167 F.2d 484
(C.C.P.A. 1948).
89 EXPLAINING MAJOR AMENDMENTS, supra note 37, at 1-2.
90 Id.
91 Id at 2.
92 Id
93 Shniderman, supra note 32, at 263.
94 Id.
95 YONG SHIK CHANG, HOw To LICENSE-YOUR TRADEMARK IN KOREA 37 (1987).
96 Id
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the disclosure of licensees should lead to competition between multiple li-
censees. The competition between those licensees to avoid "commercial
suicide" should result in quality improvement, bringing the quality of the
good very close to the level of that of the licensor's. This increase in qual-
ity will benefit the Thai public. Without any further amendment of the new
Trademark Act of 1991, the Thai Registrar is empowered by the wording of
Section 69 to order the licensee to provide this information to the public.97
However, this information should not lead to the development of second,
domestic trademarks. Since 1992 it is against internationally agreed norms
to demand the use of this form of combined trademarks (e.g., KIA-
HONDA).98
Another problem with quality control is found in the provisions of
Sections 72, 73, 74, and 75, which have been criticized because under these
sections only interested persons or the Registrar, but not the licensors or li-
censees, may make an appeal to the Board for a cancellation of a trademark
agreement. 99 However, Section 72, which provides these rights to interested
persons and the Registrar,100 is important in the control of the quality of the
trademarked goods after a registration of trademark license is approved by
the Registrar. The same kind of safeguard provisions can also be found in
the Japanese trademark law, the Korean trademark law and Taiwan's trade-
mark law.10 1
B. Improved Enforcement of Licensing Agreements Containing
Restrictive Clauses
In 1986, the Thai government took its first step into the intervention
of international patent licensing agreements by the promulgation of
Ministerial Ordinance No.7.102 This Ordinance adopted the safeguard pro-
visions of the WIPO Model Law for Developing Countries On Inventions
97 Thai Trademark Act § 69 (using language that a licensing agreement does not "cause confusion to
the public").
98 As the recent draft agreement regarding licensing and assignment reads: " it being understood
that the compulsory licensing of trademark shall not be permitted .... " Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods (Draft), in "THE DUNKEL
DRAFT" FROM THE GATT SECRETARIAT 65 (Institute for International Legal Information ed., 1992).
99 Chaimungkanont, supra note 25, at 27.
100 See Thai Trademark Act § 72 infra appendix p. 54.
101 See generally, Morowitz, supra note 2.
102 Major Issues in Trademark Licensing, supra note 7, at 216. This ordinance was based on
Section 39(l) of the Patent Act of 1979.
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(Volume II), in order to establish a legal and administrative framework for
the examination and registration of patent licensing agreements.1
03
However, the Ordinance only empowers the Thai authority to scrutinize re-
strictive clauses contained in patent licensing agreements, not trademark
licensing agreements or other technology licensing agreements.1
°4
Another problem is that the Thai Registrar is not empowered by spe-
cific legislation to scrutinize restrictive clauses included in trademark
licensing applications. This is because Thailand has neither a technological
development policy nor a competition policy that is sufficiently clear to be
translated into law. However, in order to more actively intervene in inter-
national trademark licensing agreements, the Thai authorities could adopt
the BIRPI Model Trademark Law Section 24: Invalid Clauses in License
Contracts of the WIPO Model Law for Developing Countries on Marks,
Trade Names and Act of Unfair Competition."15 The aim of this Section is
"to prevent the licensor from imposing upon the licensee restrictions, in the
industrial or commercial field, which are not based on the exclusive rights
conferred by the registration of the mark."'106 In essence, adopting Section
24 would provide a form of antitrust or antimonopoly law,107 which
Thailand does not currently have. 108 An explanatory note to Section 24,
subsection (2) gives some examples of restrictions which are lawful. These
are considered by authorities in most countries to be lawful restrictions.109
103 See WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, supra note 29, at 294-295. There are 17
restrictive clauses that WIPO suggests developing authorities to order the licensing parties not to include in
an international patent agreement or if already included be deleted. The Thai drafters adopted 15 of them
(excluding No. I and 2) by translating them into Thai word for word.
104 Major Issues in Trademark Licensing, supra note 7, at 216.
105 MODEL LAW FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES ON MARKS, TRADE NAMES, AND ACTS OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION, supra note 6, at 55.
106 Id' A good explanation of"the exclusive rights conferred by the registration of the mark" can be
found in OECD's Report ofthe Committed of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices which reads: "The
exclusive rights conferred by the registration gives protection to a distinctive name, symbol or device used
in connection with products or services to identify their commercial source and to enable customers to dis-
tinguish products and select those which measure up to expected standards of quality and performance.
Trademark law prevents others from using a confusing similar mark on competing goods, thereby protect-
ing purchasers from confusion, mistake or deception about their source or sponsorship. Trademark rights
may not be used to prevent others from making a product or from selling it under a non-confusing mark.
Thus, the trademark is less extensive and less absolute than that available under the patent law."
ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES
RELATING TO TRADEMARKS 9 (1978).
107 MODEL LAW FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES ON MARKS, TRADE NAMES, AND ACTS OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION, supra note 6, at 55.
108 The official comments to this Model Law point out that countries that do not have general anti-
trust or antimonopoly statutes to protect free competition would find this section useful. Id
109 Id.
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However, if the Thai authorities wish to adopt Section 24, they should ap-
point an interdisciplinary group to study the application of the Japanese Fair
Trade Commission Guidelines since 1968 along with the Korean Economic
Planning Board decree No. 50. These countries' experiences may provide
guidelines that are helpful to the present economic and technological stage
of Thailand.
In order to achieve the objective of modernizing its trademark law,
the Thai government should adopt specific guidelines (such as BIRBI
Section 24) to set criteria for screening restrictive clauses. Finally, in order
to put the Thai Trademark Act in line with similar acts in other modem na-
tions, the Thai authority should delete the following: " . . . and is not
contrary to public order, morality, or public policy," from Section 69 as well
as "is contrary to public order, morality, or public policy" from Section 72.
This would make the law more clear by removing some of the Registrar's
discretionary powers. These deletions would not harm the public, as indi-
viduals could still use the Civil Code to prevent agreements that are
contrary to public order, morality, or public policy.
V. CONCLUSION
The New Thai Trademark Act is an improvement over the previous
Act. However, revisions still need to be made. Currently, there is insuffi-
cient protection for consumers. Also, the Registrar's powers provide too
much flexibility, which may lead to irrational and inconsistent decisions.
By studying the trademark laws and experiences of other nations, Thailand
may improve its current laws, and bring itself more in line with its major
international trading partners.
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APPENDIX: §§ 68 TO 79 OF THE 1991 THAI TRADEMARK ACT
PART 5
LICENSE TO USE TRADEMARK
Section 68 The proprietor of a registered trademark may grant a li-
cense to other persons to use his trademark for any or all of the goods for
which it is registered.
The trademark license agreement according to paragraph 1 must be
made in writing and must be registered with the Registrar.
The registration of a trademark license agreement according to para-
graph 2 shall be applied for in accordance with the rules and procedures
prescribed in the Ministerial Regulations. But the application for the regis-
tration thereof shall at least provide the following particulars:
(1) The conditions and terms of agreement made between
the proprietor of the trademark and the applicant to be the authorized licen-
see, which conditions must actually enable the former to control the quality
of the goods manufactured by the latter;
(2) The goods on which the licensed trademark is used.
Section 69 If, in the opinion of the Registrar, the agreement accord-
ing to Section 68 does not deceive or cause confusion to the public and is
not contrary to public order, morality, or public policy, the Registrar shall
issue an order accepting such agreement upon such conditions or limitations
as he thinks fit for the sake of the public. Otherwise, the Registrar shall is-
sue an order rejecting the licensing agreement.
When the Registrar has issued a definite order according to paragraph
1, he shall notify the proprietor and the applicant licensee in writing thereof
without delay. In the event that the Registrar accepts the agreement upon
certain conditions or limitations or rejects the same, the Registrar shall ac-
cordingly notify such persons stating his reasons for accepting or rejecting
the agreement.
The proprietor of the trademark or the applicant licensee shall have
the right to appeal against the Registrar's [order?] according to paragraph 1
1994
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to the Board within ninety days from the date of receipt of the Registrar's
notification, otherwise the Registrar's order shall be final.
The Board's decisions on the appeal as stated in paragraph 3 shall be
final.
Section 70 The use of the trademark by the authorized licensee in
conducting his authorized business activities shall be considered to be the
use of the trademark by the proprietor.
Section 71 The Proprietor of the registered trademark and the author-
ized licensee may jointly request the registrar to enter changes on the
registration of trademark license agreement with regard to the goods on
which the licensed trademark is used or to the conditions or limitations im-
posed in the licensing agreement by the proprietor. The provisions of
Section 69 shall apply mutatis mutandis.
The application for entering changes on the register of licensing
agreements shall be in accordance with the rules and procedures prescribed
in the Ministerial Regulations.
Section 72 The proprietor of the trademark and the authorized licen-
see may jointly request the Registrar to cancel the registration of a
trademark license agreement.
The proprietor of the trademark or the authorized licensee may re-
quest the Registrar to cancel the registration of a trademark license
agreement if he can show that the agreement has already been terminated.
Any interested person or the Registrar may request the Board to can-
cel the registration of trademark licensee if he can show the following:
(1) The use of the trademark by the authorized licensee de-
ceives or causes confusion to the public or is contrary to public order or
morality or public policy, or
(2) The proprietor of the trademark is no longer able to ac-
tually control the quality of the goods bearing the trademark.
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The cancellation of the registration of a trademark license agreement
shall be in accordance with the rules and procedures prescribed in the
Ministerial Regulations.
Section 73 When a request as stated in Section 72, paragraph 2 or
paragraph 3 has been made, the Registrar or the Board, as the case may be,
shall notify the proprietor of the trademark or the authorized licensee in
writing thereof, as the case may be, in order that he can furnish his clarifi-
cation within the specified time which is not less than fifteen days and not
more than sixty days from the date of receipt of the Registrar's or the
Board's notification, as the case may be.
Taking into consideration the request as mentioned in Section 71 or
72, the Registrar or the Board, as the case may be, shall have the concerned
persons give further evidence or provide clarifying statements.
Section 74 When the Registrar has issued the order according to
Section 72, paragraph 2, he shall give a written notice thereof together with
his reasons for issuing such order to the proprietor of the trademark and the
authorized licensee without delay. The said order shall come into force
from the date of receipt of the Registrar's notification.
The proprietor of the trademark or the authorized licensee shall have
the right to appeal the Registrar's order, as stated in paragraph 1, to the
Board within ninety days from the date of receipt of the Registrar's notifi-
cation. The Registrar's order shall be final if the appeal has not been made
within the specified time.
Section 75 When the Board has issued the order according to
Section 72, paragraph 3, the Board shall give written notice thereof, to-
gether with the reasons for issuing such order, to the proprietor of the
trademark and the authorized licensee without delay. The said order shall
come into force from the date of receipt of the Board's notification.
Any interested person or the Registrar shall have the right to appeal
the Board's order as indicated in paragraph 1 to the Court within ninety
days from the date of receipt of the Board's notification. The Board's order
shall be final if the appeal has not been made within the specified time.
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Section 76 In the event of the cancellation of a trademark registra-
tion, the license to use such trademark shall become null and void.
Section 77 In the absence of any provision in the trademark license
agreement to the contrary, the proprietor of the trademark shall have the
right to use such trademark or he may authorize any other person to use the
same in addition to the authorized licensee.
Section 78 In the absence of any provision in the trademark license
agreement to the contrary, the authorized licensee shall have the right to use
the trademark throughout the country for all the goods in respect of which
registration has been made during the validity of the registration of that
trademark, including of any renewal of its registration.
Section 79 In the absence of any provision in the trademark license
agreement to the contrary, the authorized licensee shall not transfer the
authorization thereunder to any third person, nor sublicense any other per-
sonto use the trademark.
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